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result of monopoly pricing based on the
unique asset available to the ABE-its
members who possess "highly favorable
mortality and morbidity rates." 106 S.Ct.
at 2429. In discussing the third factorthat the participants could collectively
change the nature of the program - the
Court looked at the agreement itself which
requires assignment of the dividend as a
condition to participation in the program.
The Coun rejected the argument that the
assignment was voluntary because members could change the policy at any time,
stating that the Claims Court had put too
much weight on such an unsubstantiated
argument. Finally, the Court held that the
ABE's program was "an example of precisely the son of unfair competition that
Congress intended to prevent" by enacting
the unrelated business income tax.
If the ABE's members may deduct pan
of their premium payments as a charitable contribution, the effective cost
of ABE's insurance will be lower than
the cost of competing policies that do
not offer tax benefits. Similarly, if
ABE may escape taxes on its earnings,
it need not be as profitable as its commercial counterpans in order to receive the same return on its investment. Should a commercial company
attempt to displace ABE as the group
policyholder, therefore, it would be at
a decided disadvantage.
106 S.Ct. at 2432. The only factor in the
ABE's favor was that the insurance plan
was consistently presented as pan of its
fund-raising effort. However, the Court
felt that this factor could not stand alone as
a basis for ovenurning the assessment by
the IRS.
II. The Court upheld the finding of the
Claims Court regarding the individual
participant's claim for a charitable deduction. The fact that the respondents received
a benefit from their contribution did not
automatically make the premium payments
non-deductible. Had any of the claimants
demonstrated that the contributions were
purposely made "in excess of the value of
any benefit" received in return, then some
deduction may have been allowed under
§170 of the Code. However, none of the
respondents in the action offered any proof
that similar policies could have been purchased for a lower cost. Such a lack of proof
led the Coun to assume "that the value of
ABE's insurance to those taxpayers at least
equals their premium payments." 106
S.Ct. at 2434. Thus, no charitable motivation could be found by the Coun.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens'
main argument concerned the viability of
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the Court's analysis regarding the ABE
program and its effect on unfair competition. In focusing his argument on the
Coun's failure to justify its conclusion
with any concrete evidence, Justice Stevens
remarked,
The trial judge scoured the record for
evidence pointing to a harmful effect
on competition and found none (footnote omitted). The absence of evidence
in the record, rather than the Coun's
ruminations about possibilities and
likelihoods, should control our analysis. 106 S.Ct. at 2436.
Justice Stevens went on to refute the Court's
other findings regarding the panicipants
involuntary assignment of the dividends,
the taint of a monopoly by the ABE, and
the lack of a factual basis behind the charitable panicipation of the members, concluding that the decisions of the coun of
appeals and the claims court were correct.
The decision in United States, Petitioner
v. American Endowment et al., represents
yet another clarification' of the Internal
Revenue Code; this time affecting members of the legal community because of the
Court's interpretation of what constitutes
a trade or business for purposes of the unrelated business tax.
- Barbara E. Wixon

MacDonald v. Yolo County: THE
SUPREME COURT REEXAMINES
THE CONCEPT OF INVERSE
CONDEMNATION IN
DETERMINING WHETHER AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
WITHOUT COMPENSATION HAS
OCCURRED.
In MacDonald v. Yolo County, 54
U.S.L.W. 4782 (U.S. June 25, 1986) (No.
84-2015), the Supreme Coun of the United
States in a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice
Stevens reaffirmed Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980), in holding
that absent knowing the nature and extent
of permitted development, the Coun cannot adjudicate the constitutionality of a
regulation that propons to limit it; in essence because limiting intense development does not prohibit all economic use of
the land sought to be developed.
In 1975, appellants submitted a tentative subdivision map to the Yolo County
Planning Commission and County Board
of Supervisors proposing to construct
a 159-home subdivision on land which

was in part a corn field. Both the Yolo
County Planning Commission and the
County Board of Supervisors, appellees,
rejected the subdivision plan. The Board
based their rejection on what they considered numerous factors "inconsistent
with the General Plan of the County of
Yolo, (and) the specific plan the County of
Yolo embodied in zoning regulations for
the County." MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at
4782. These included: 1) the lack of access
to and from the subdivision to a public
street; 2) no provision for public sewer service by any government entity; 3) inadequate police protection for the subdivision; and 4) no provision for water or
maintainance of a water system by any
governmental entity. Id.
As a result of the Board's decision, the
appellants claimed inverse condemnation
and sought a declaratory judgment and
monetary relief.
Inverse condemnation exists when a
governmental entity restricts land use
through regulation, such as by prohibiting
development, but does not condemn the
land thereby removing the landowner's
remedy of just compensation. Agins, 447
U.S. at 255. The appellants accused the
Board of "restricting the propeny to an
open-space agricultural use by denying all
permit applications, subdivision maps,
and other requests to implement any other
use, and thereby of appropriating the 'entire economic use' of [their] propeny 'for
the sole purpose of [providing] ... a public, open-space buffer.'" MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4782. Appellants concluded
that the Board's ruling on the regulations
denied any beneficial use of their propeny, thus it was an unconstitutional taking
without just compensation, or inverse condemnation.ld. at 4783.
The California Superior Coun sustained
appellees demurrer citing the alternative
uses appellants could make of their land
under the Yolo County Code §§8-2.502,
.503. Id. Quoting Agins, the Coun concluded that "irrespective of the insufficiency of the appellant's factual allegations,
monetary damages for inverse condemnation [based on land use regulations] are
foreclosed .... " MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W.
at 4783.
The California Coun of Appeals affirmed
the superior coun's application of Agins
where monetary damages for inverse condemnation are not permitted in California.
MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4783. The
court stated that a landowner cannot recover "in inverse condemnation based
upon land use regulation." /d. In funher
tying the facts in this action to that in
Agins, the coun offered that the only remedy available to appellants would be to set

aside the regulations as unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, as in Agins, the court of appeals did not find an unconstitutional taking because "the refusal of the defendants
to permit the intensive development desired by the landowner does not preclude
less intensive, but still valuable development. Accordingly, the complaint fails to
state a cause of action." MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4783.
The Supreme Court granted the appellants petition to consider the constitutional
issue involving a regulatory taking. But, in
a decision that essentially mirrored the
lower courts reasoning, the Supreme Court
did not make a final decision on the merits
because a final determination had not been
made by the Board of Commissioners concerning the permitted use of the appellants
property, thus making the issue not ripe
for decision despite the prohibition on the
housing development. Id. at 4784.
In refusing to decide on the merits, the
Court followed Agins in permitting local
governments the power ofland use control
through regulations that limit intensive
development. The Court centered its reasoning behind two related components.
First, that the appellant must establish
that the regulation has "taken" his property or has "gone too far." Second, that any
proffered compensation is simply not just.
MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4784.
The Court, in resolving the two components, examined the progeny of ,'taking"
cases evolving from Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), through
Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980),
and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), to Williamson
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. __ (1985). MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4784.
In Williamson, the appellant-developer
failed to exhaust available state avenues to
permit development or receive just compensation. MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at
4784. And in Agins, the Court failed to
recognize a taking because development,
albeit less intensive, was still permitted. In
applying the facts in this action to their
past examinations, Justice Stevens went
on to conclude that as in Agins, Williamson, and San Diego Gas, the Court cannot
decide whether the Constitution requires a
monetary remedy to redress some regulatory takings because the appellant had
left the Court uncertain as to whether a
taking had occurred. MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4785. The appellant had received the Board's determination on only
the subdivision plan, thus leaving open
the "final, definitive position regarding
how [the board] will apply the regulations

at issue to the particular land at issue." Id.
Consequently, the appellant had not established that their property had been
taken and the Board's decision was upheld.
Justice White, in his dissent, felt that
a taking did occur when the Board denied the subdivision plan. MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4785. He refuted the majorities application of Agins, finding that the
appellant would be unable "to develop his
property in some economically beneficial
manner" because further application for
development would be futile. MacDonald,
54 U.S.L.W. at 4786. The dissent went on
to conclude that based on the facts, a taking had occurred and the Court should remand for an explanation by the court of
appeals as to the precise basis for its judgment. Id. at 4788.
The impact of this decision will favor
municipalities that seek to limit growth by
denying high density housing developments and support state regulations such
as Maryland's recently enacted Critical
Areas Legislation. Conversely, developers
will certainly feel as the dissent, that any
limit to use is a taking deserving of compensation. Nevertheless, the Court seems
to be assured of maintaining the view outlined in MacDonald as long as the 5-4 majority is maintained. And even with the recent change in the make-up of the Court,
which essentially effects the dissent's side,
it seems likely that similar land use controls will be sustained by the Court.
-Michael D. Mallinoff

Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates 0,
Tourism Co, of Puerto Rico:
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
REGULATIONS RESTRICTING
ADVERTISING AIMED AT
PUERTO RICO RESIDENTS
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 54 U.S.L.W.
4956 (U.S. June 24, 1986), the Supreme
Court continued to explore the contours of
first amendment protection for commercial speech which the court had initially
recognized in 1976. The Court held that a
Puerto Rico statute and regulations restricting the advertising of casino gambling
aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico, but
not at tourists, does not facially violate
the first amendment or the due process or
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Beginning in 1948, the Puerto Rico
Legislature has legalized various forms of

casino gambling, adding additional games
since the initial Games of Chance Act of
1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948 (Act).
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, § 71 (1972). However, the Act states that "[n]o gambling
room shall be permitted to advertise or
otherwise offer their facilities to the public
of Puerto Rico." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, §
77 (1972). Furthermore, the Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico
issued regulations which specified and expanded the scope of the prohibition of advertising of casino gambling directed at
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico and requiring prior approval by the Tourism Development Company of any casino advertising. P.R.R. & Regs. tit. 15, § 76-218
(1972).
In 1981, the Appellant Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates, doing business as Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino,
filed a declaratory judgment action against
the Tourism Company in the Superior
Court of Puerto Rico, seeking a declaration that this regulatory scheme violated
appellant's commercial speech rights under the United States Constitution. The
court upheld the facial constitutionality of
the Act, narrowly construing it as "the
only advertisement prohibited by law originally is that which is contracted with an
advertising agency, for consideration, to
attract the resident to·bet at the dice, card,
roulette and bingo tables." 54 U .S.L. W. at
4958. The appellant's appeal was dismissed
by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico as "it
[did] not present a substantial constitutional question." Id. at 4959. However, the
United States Supreme Court granted the
petition for writ of certiorari filed by Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, upheld the decision and narrowing
construction issued by the lower court.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found two reasons for the Court's holding. First, he determined that by applying
the first amendment analysis concerning
commercial speech restrictions as dictated
by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), the Puerto Rico regulatory scheme
passed constitutional muster. Second, the
Court, creating a new form of first amendment analysis parturient of greater enroads
on the protection of speech, held that "the
greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban advertising of casino gambling." 54 U.S.L.W. at 4961.
The Court reiterated that a limited form
of first amendment protection for commercial speech was first recognized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Counci~ Inc., 425 U.S.
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